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Inflow of Educational Capital, Intermediation and Informal Sector 
 
Abstract 
Informal sector comprising of unrecorded, unregistered activities in developing economies of 
the world is a common feature at present scenario. Existence of such sectors in an economy 
clearly reflects the weakness of government to provide employment opportunities for all. 
Such informal activities are again facilitated through the extortionists who are bribed by the 
informal producers. Under such an economic structure the paper investigates into the effect of 
inflow of educational capital on endogenously determined factor prices and output of formal 
and informal sectors of an economy.Though there is no change in the factor earnings, an 
inflow of educational capital gives a boost to the output of skilled sector irrespective of any 
factor intensity assumption. Output of formal sector also expands depending on the factor 
intensity assumption but quite interestingly no change is seen in the output of informal sector. 
Inflow of educational capital leads to dampening of intermediation activities in an economy 
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1. Introduction 
     The developing economies of the world are characterised by the existence of a vast informal 
sector. This sector in particular not only chalks out a way to help economies to solve its 
unemployment problem but also contributes significantly to domestic savings and investments. In 
simple words the informal economy or the grey economy refers to those income earning activities that 
are outside government regulation, taxation and observation. However, illegal activities are typically 
excluded from its definition.There are several examples of informal economic activity including 
people who sell produce at a roadside stand or those who perform day labour at a construction site in 
exchange for cash payments. The informal forms of organizations are major players in manufacturing, 
construction, transport, trade, hotels and restaurants services.Some of the characteristic features of 
informal employment are lack of protection in the event of non-payment of wages, compulsory 
overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without notice or compensation, unsafe working conditions and the 
absence of social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and health insurance. To suit the purpose of the 
paper we define the informal sector as one which does not have to pay the minimum wage. A lot of 
papers in literature of informal sector have used this interpretation such as Agenor and Montiel 
(1997), Carruth and Oswald (1981), Marjit (2003), Marjit and Kar (2009, 2009a), Marjit, kar and 
Beladi (2007), Kar and Marjit (2001), Beladi and Chao (1993), Beladi and Yabuuchi (2001)etc. 
Emerging markets tend to rank highly among nations that have the largest informal economies, 
whereas developed markets tend to have the least informal economic activity within them. In a recent 
study by Friedrich Schneider (2012), 162 countries were ranked by the relative size of their informal 
economies and it is found that Bolivia, Georgia and Panama are countries that have the largest 
concentration of informal economic activity followed by the others. U.S ranked at the bottom at 161 
followed by Switzerland. Shadow economies may seem advantageous to certain workers because 
wages are received free of taxes. However, the social cost of these wages manifest themselves in the 
form of lost tax revenues and social security payments.Informalisation of jobs has become a matter of 
concern with the initiation of liberalisation policies in the early nineties. On an average, more than 70 
percent of the working population in developing economies is employed in the informal sector 
(Agenor,1996). This sector also accounts for a large share in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
the developed and developing countries. According to the estimates of Schneider (2005), the 
contribution of income generated in the informal economy to GDP varied from 8.4 percent in United 
States to 68.3 percent  in Bolivia in the years 2002-03. Moreover, the percentage contribution is on 
rise in several countries, such as Columbia moved from 39.1 percent in the years 1999-2000 to 43.4 
percent in the years 20002-03, Haiti from 55.4 percent to 58.6 percent and so on for other economies. 
The share of informal economy is also significantly large in terms of contribution to employment, 
particularly in developing world. In all regions of the developing world, informal employment outside 
of agriculture represents nearly half or more of the total non-agricultural employment (ILO, 2002). 
Incase of India, the unorganized sector accounts for more than 90 percent of the workforce in the 
country and almost 50 percent of national income evolve from this sector (National Statistical 
Commission, 2012). 
A lot of literature suggests corruptionthat has its roots lie deep in bureaucratic and political 
institutions as one of the reasons for the existence of informal sector in developing economies 
(Kaufmann 1997, Johnson et al. 1998, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 2000). In other words, we may 
say that the survival of informal sector requires some negotiations with the administration as it is 
illegal by nature. This negotiations is done by politically supported intermediaries, called the 
‘extortionists’ who take care of legal troubles and other hurdles for the informal producers and in turn 
extracts some amount of the value of informal produce (Marjit and Mandal, 2010).  Theoretically, 
corruption and informal economy can be either complements or substitutes. The negative link 
between corruptionand the size of informal economy is studied by scholars like Johnson et al. (1997), 
Choi and Thum (2004), Dreher et al. (2005) to name a few.The full employment model of Johnson et 
al (1997) depicts informal economy as a substitute for the official (formal) economy and exhibits a 
negative relationship between the two. An increase in informal economy results in a decrease in the 
official economy. Higher corruption in the official economy increases the size of informal economy 
which functions like a tax on firms in the official economy and drives them underground.Choi and 
Thum (2004) present a model where the option of entrepreneurs to get underground constrains a 
corrupt official’s ability to ask for bribes.  The shadow or informal economy mitigates distortions in 
the official economy and disables bureaucrats from realizing personal gains. The existence of the 
informal economy thus reduces corruption.Johnson et al. (1998), Schneider and Enste (2000), 
Friedman et al., (2000)on the contrary, model corruption and informal economy as 
complements.Dreher and Schneider (2006) suggest that corruption and the informal economy tend to 
be substitutes in high income countries but complements in low income countries. Bribes are one of 
the main tools of corruption which raises transaction costs and uncertainty in an economy. It impedes 
long term foreign and domestic investment,misallocates talent to rent-seeking activities and distorts 
sectoral priorities and technology choices. It pushes firms underground, undercuts the state’s liability 
to raise revenues and leads to ever-higher tax rates being levied on fewer and fewer taxpayers (Gray 
and Kaufmann, 1998).  Bribes can be used to reduce the amount of taxes and other fees collected by 
Government to set up a legal institution or firm. Corruption tends to flourish when institutions are 
weak and government policies generate economic rents.Substantial corruption among the law 
enforcement authorities, financial agencies, bureaucrats, politicians and other regulators would 
essentially mean more bribery and greater rent seeking in the formal sector (Saha, 2001). Thus cost of 
creating new business and maintaining it in the formal sector rises in presence of intermediation 
activities and this crowds out some entrepreneurs in preference for informal entrepreneurship as they 
seek to avoid bureaucratic rigidities and high tax burden.Marjit, Mukherjee and Kolmer (2006) 
analyzed the causes behind the emergence of an informal sector in a political economy framework. 
For economies characterised by high unemployment, high inequality and poverty, the government 
may choose a lower level of good governance to maximize income for a large informal sector and 
avoid social conflicts and political disturbances.Loayza (1996) in a study of Latin American 
economies shows that a robust and less burdensome institutional framework reduces the size of 
informal sector. Specifically, a standard deviation improvement in the strength and efficiency of the 
institutional framework is associated with 0.42 standard deviation decrease in the size of informal 
sector.In a study of 49 countries of Latin America, former Soviet Union and OECD, it is shown that 
one-point improvement in Transparency International (TI) corruption index is associated with a 5.1 
percent reduction in the informal economy. Further, using the Global Competitiveness Survey as 
proxy for bribery, a one-point improvement in the index implies an 8 percent reduction in informal 
sector (Johnson et al., 1998). Friedman et al. (2000) shows that irrespective of country’s level of 
economic activity as proxied by GDP per capita, a one- point improvement in the corruption index is 
associated with 9.7 percent reduction in the size of informal sector.Thus, regardless of the economy’s 
level of economic activity and the kind of corruption index used it is clear that the size of informal 
sector increases with the level of corruption. Dutta, kar and Roy (2011) made the first empirical 
attempt to investigate corruption-informality linkage in India based on a study of 20 Indian states. The 
result confirms the positive relationship between level of corruption and size of informal sector. 
Beside this the study also points out that as state level productivity rises the positive impact of 
corruption on the size of informal sector reverses itself.In order to reduce extortion in the informal 
segment countries like Ghana, Senegal, Kenya and others have already attempted to facilitate and 
promote registration and license to informal units. This has resulted in a significant reduction in the 
degree of extortion (Fjeldstad, 2001). In this paper we stick to the general definition of corruption as 
the misuse or abuse of public power for private gains (World Bank, 1997, UNDP, 1999). The World 
Bank (2009) defines corruption as “It distorts the rule of law, weakens a nation’s institutional 
foundation, and severely affects the poor who are already the most disadvantaged members of our 
Society and is among the greatest obstacles to economic and social development”. 
     In this paper we have incorporated educational capital as an indirect factor of production. This 
educational capital is used only to train the unskilled labours of the economy and let them secure a job 
in the highly paid skilled sector. This form of capital is not directly involved in the production 
process. Unskilled labour forces are employed by both the formal and informal entrepreneurs. Even 
after satisfaction of demand of formal and informal producers some unskilled labours are still left 
without a job. Now, this part of labour force cannot remain unemployed for a long time and ultimately 
they get involved in the extortion sector to earn a livelihood.Developing economies of the world face 
a great crisis of educational capital or training facilities. Thus educational capital now-a-days moves 
from developed to developing countries as the demand for skilled labour naturally grows with the 
process of development. Hence, educational capital mobility is an important ingredient of 
development process.Importance of educational capital has been studied by a number of scholars like 
Lucas (2002), Barro (1996), Easterly (2001), Findlay (1995), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor 
and zeira (1993) etc. to name a few. Educational capital mainly enriches human capital of an economy 
through the process of training.A microeconomic model shows that education investment for workers 
significantly affects his or her productivity in workplace (Lucas, 1988). Empirical literature on the 
link between human capital and growth indicates that it contributes not only towards output growth 
but also improves a country’s capacity to adopt new technologies. Countries with larger stock of 
human capital experience faster growth. Technology fails to flow to the poor countries because of 
their poor endowment of human capital and a high level of initial endowment of human capital 
improves economy’s ability to utilize new ideas (Nelson and Phelps, 1966). In this particular paper we 
have tried to trace out the effect of inflow of such educational capita on output of an economy which 
is plagued with activities like corruption, bribery etc. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed discussion about the 
structure of the economy along with the competitive price equations for different sectors. Section 3 
discusses about the results obtained and its empirical explanations. Finally section 4 concludes. A 
detailed mathematical calculation is provided in the appendix.  
2. The Basic Model and Solutions 
One important feature of informal sector is the existence of harassment related corruption. Since by 
definition informal sector is illegal or extra legal, it is susceptible to bureaucratic and political 
harassment. Therefore, in order to get rid of the harassment producers need to get hold of 
intermediation. Precisely speaking this intermediation is done by unskilled labour and capital. Thus a 
part of the value of informal produce is lost which is spent for labour and capital used in 
intermediation. Based on this background we have considered a small open economy comprising of 
three sectorsproducing three different goods X, Y and Z and one intermediation (corruptive) sector 
represented by N. Out of these three goods X and Y are produced in a formal sectors and Z is 
produced informally. Physical Capital and labour are the factors of production used for producing 
these three commodities. According to the tradition labours are segregated into skilled labour and 
unskilled labour. Skilled labours are sector specific and are trained using certain amount of 
educational capital endowed within the economy.Educational capital is not directly involved in the 
production process, it is used only for training the unskilled labour force of the economy.Physical 
capital is a direct input and is freely mobile among these three sectors. Unskilled labour and physical 
capital are assumed to be freely mobile between the informal sector and the extortion sector. Prices of 
the goods are determined in rest of the world as the country in consideration is a small open economy 
with a small contribution in world’s trade volume. 
     Commodity X is produced in a skill specific formal sector using skilled labour (S) and physical 
capital (K). The labours of sector X have attained some special training to secure a job here. Special 
training can easily encompass the issues such as vocational training, technical training, computer 
literacy, software knowledge etc. A software developing firm may be a good example of this type of 
sector.Since X is a skill intensive formal sector the labours are paid a wage at a rate 𝑊ௌ which is 
obviously greater than the wage of unskilled labour. Physical capital (K) gets a return ‘r’ per unit. Per 
unit price of commodity X (𝑃௑) is determined in the international market and the country in 
assumption being a small participant in world trade is unable to influence the price. Competitive price 
equation for this sector is given as 
𝑊ௌ𝑎ௌ௑ + 𝑟𝑎௄௑ = 𝑃௑                                 (1) 
     Commodity Y is also produced in a formal sector using unskilled labour (L) and physical capital 
(K). Formal sector is characterised by presence of strong labour union and the workers here get a pre 
negotiated fixed wage (𝑊ഥ ).Physical capital (K) gets a return ‘r’ per unit. Labours of this sector do not 
have any specified skill as the labours employed in sector X but they are lucky enough to secure a job 
in this formal sector and earn an assured high and fixed wage (𝑊ഥ ). As discussed earlier price of 
commodity Y is again assumed to be given as the country in consideration is a small participant in 
world trade. The competitive price equation for this sector is written as 
𝑊ഥ 𝑎௅௒ + 𝑟𝑎௄௒ = 𝑃௒                                     (2) 
After satisfying the demand for labour in these two formal sectors, some labour still remain 
unemployed. This unemployed section of the workforce  have neither any specific training nor are 
they lucky enough to secure a job in the unskilled formal sector Y. But they cannot of course remain 
without a job for a long time. They have to get engaged somewhere to obtain their subsistence level of 
earning. This leads to the existence of informal sector Z in our model.Sector Z uses unskilled labour 
(L) and physical capital (K) for its production. Z being an informal sector there is absence of trade 
union to protect the interest of the workers and hence there is no minimum wage legislation law. 
Workers are paid a market based competitive wage (W) and the capital gets a return r. However, this 
sector is distorted by the intermediation of local ‘tolapickers’ and thus a certain proportion (α) of the 
value of the good (𝑃௓) is appropriated by 𝐿ே  as a fee of extortion. The competitive price equation for 
this sector is written as 
𝑊𝑎௅௓ + 𝑟𝑎௅௓ = 𝑃௓(1 − 𝛼)                        (3) 
      We further assume that unskilled labour and some amount of physical capital are involved in the 
activities of intermediation. Labours involved in the intermediation activities (𝐿ே) get a wage equal to 
the wage of the informal workers (W) and capital involved in intermediation activities (𝐾ே) gets a 
return of r. Now the expenditure involved in intermediation activities must be equal to the value of 
lost output of the informal sector. Suppose α is the fraction of output that is lost due to institutional 
complications related intermediations. Thus we may write  
𝑊𝐿ே + 𝑟𝐾ே = 𝛼𝑃௓𝑍                                 (4) 
     We also assume that the production function for intermediation exhibits a linear relationship 
represented by the following equation 
𝐿ே = 𝛾𝐾ே                                                    (5) 
The economy is endowed with certain amount of skilled labour (S), unskilled labour (L), physical 
capital (K) and educational capital (E). It is assumed that all the factors are fully utilized in the 
production process. 
Informal workers have a chance to get trained and secure job in the skill specific sector X. We assume 
that 𝐿ଵ amount of informal workers are trained and upgraded to skilled labour 𝑆ଵ using a certain 
amount of educational capital (E). This upgraded skilled labour now gets a job in the skill specific 
sector X. S amount of skilled labour were already given in the economy and 𝑆ଵis the amount of 
informal labour that are getting trained in the process and adding to the stock of skilled labours.The 
full employment condition for skilled labour in the economy can be written as 
𝑎ௌ௑𝑋 = 𝑆 + 𝑆ଵ                                              (6) 
       Now, the economy in concerned is already endowed with L amount of unskilled labour. Out of 
this stock 𝐿ே  is the amount of unskilled labour who are engaged in corruption activities and 𝑆ଵis the 
amount of labour that goes out for training. Thus full employment condition for unskilled labour is 
given by the following equation 
𝑎௅௒𝑌 + 𝑎௅௓𝑍 = 𝐿 − 𝐿ே − 𝑆ଵ                          (7) 
       Similarly the full employment condition for physical capital is given by the following equation 
𝑎௄௑𝑋 + 𝑎௄௒𝑌 + 𝑎௄௓𝑍 = 𝐾 − 𝐾ே                    (8) 
       The economy in concerned is also endowed with certain amount of educational capital (E) which 
is used only for the purpose of training the unskilled labour. In this model we do not incorporate the 
time factor needed in acquiring skill. This is a static model. Another important point to be noted is 
that the educational training sector reflects fixed proportion technology 𝜇ாௌ. The cost of acquiring 
skill has to borne by the unskilled labour himself.The full employment condition for educational 
capital is given by  
𝜇ாௌ𝑆ଵ = 𝐸                                                           (9) 
       For simplicity we assume that only skilled labours will undergo training in lieu of getting a job in 
the high skilled intensive sector X where they could get a higher wage premium. This wage must 
compensate his earning from the informal sector Z (W) and the return to the educational capital spent 
on training. This is given by equation (10) 
𝑊 + 𝜇ாௌ𝑅 = 𝑊ௌ                                                   (10) 
       The variables of the model are 𝑊ௌ, 𝑊ഥ , 𝑊, 𝑟 and R that are determined using the price equations. 
All markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive along with the market for corruption related 
activities. Competitive corruption market implies that the lost output due to intermediation is fully 
exhausted in paying out extortionists. We also have the standard neo-classical assumption of constant 
returns to scale and diminishing return to factors. We determined r from equation (2). Substituting the 
value of r in equation (1) and (3) we obtain 𝑊ௌ and W respectively. Finally using the value of W in 
equation (10) we obtain R. Further solving the endowment equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) we get the 
output effect of sector X, Y and Z. The mathematical results are summerized in the appendix and this 
will help us in exploring the effects of inflow of educational capital on price of factors and output of 
different sectors of the economy. The set of symbols used in representing the equations of the model 
are usual and used in different trade models.1 
 
 
3. Effect of inflow of educational capital in presence of intermediation activities 
       An inflow of educational capital in the economy helps to train the large chunk of unskilled labour 
force of the economy. It helps to upgrade the unskilled labours into skilled labour. An inflow of 
educational capital (E) will essentially have no impact on rate of return to physical capital (r) as it is 
already determined from equation (2) of the basic model given the wage of formal labour (𝑊ഥ )and 
price of the commodity Y. Wage of unskilled labour (W) should remain unchanged for any given α 
and 𝑃௓ and wage of skilled labour (𝑊ௌ) also remains unchanged as there is no change in r. Hence 
there will be no change in the rate of return to educational capital (R).However, an inflow of 
educational capital raises the output of the skilled formal sector X by increasing the supply of skilled 
                                                            
1𝑊ௌ=Wage of skilled labour, 𝑊ഥ =Wage of unskilled labour employed in formal sector, W=Wage of informal 
workers, r=rate of return to physical capital, R= rate of return to educational capital, X= Output of skilled 
intensive formal sector, Y= output of formal sector, Z= Output of informal sector, 𝑃௑, 𝑃௒ , 𝑃௓=Exogenous prices 
of  commodities, E,L,S,K= Total supply of educational capital, unskilled labour, skilled labour and physical 
capital in the economy, 𝑆ଵ =amount of unskilled labour upgraded to skilled labour. 𝑎௜௝= input coefficients, 𝜃௜௝= 
Relative share of i th input in the total value of j th commodity where i= S,L,K and j= X, Y, Z, ^=represents 
percentage changes for particular variables.   
labour(𝑆ଵ) in the economy. Some amount of unskilled labour gets trained using educational capital 
and secures a job in the skilled formal sector. Educational capital has a two way effect on the supply 
of labour. On one hand, it raises the supply of skilled labours in the economy and on the other it 
reduces the amount of unskilled labours in the economy. The unskilled labours going out for training 
may either come from sector Y, sector Z or the intermediation sector represented by N. The expansion 
of skilled sector also requires some capital that has to be relocated to X either from Y, Z or corruption 
activity represented by N.In general, as output of sector X expands the combined output effect of 
sector Y, Z and N falls unambiguously. The magnitude of output effect on these sectors depends 
significantly on factor intensity assumption. The mathematical solution to this general equilibrium 
model shows that there is no change in the output of informal sector Z (as is evident from equation 4) 
but the output effect on formal sector Y and that of the corruption sector N depends on the factor 
intensity assumption. 
Proposition 1:There is no change in factor earnings following an inflow of educational capital in 
presence of corruption. 
       The solutions for factor prices in the model are obtained by solving the price equations of the 
model represented through equations (1) to (4) and equation (10) (see appendix). Using the simple 
solution method for general equilibrium model through use of zero profit condition and envelope 
theorem we first derive the solution for rate of change in return to physical capital (r) from equation 
(2). With given wage rate (𝑊ഥ ) for unskilled labour and given price of informal commodity Y we find 
that there is no change in the rate of return to physical capital. Substituting the value of ?̂? = 0 in 
equations (1) we have𝑊ௌ෢ = 0 as price of formal good (X) is considered to be given exogenously. 
Further substituting ?̂? = 0 in equation (3) we have 𝑊෡ = 0with given price of commodity Z.Then 
using 𝑊෡ = 0 in equation (10) we obtain 𝑅෠ = 0 as 𝜇ாௌ is constant. 
Explanation:In present model we consider a small open economy with formal, informal sectors 
which is pegged with corruption related activities. The economy being a small one has negligible 
influence on volume of international trade and essentially has no role in determination of international 
prices of the commodities. Under such a model structure an inflow of educational capital in the 
economy which is used only for training the unskilled labour force has no factor price effect. 
Proposition 2: An inflow of educational capital increases the output of the skilled sector independent 
of any factor intensity assumption even in presence of corruption sector. 
       Differentiating equation (7) we derive an expression for change in output of skilled sector X as 
𝑋෠ = 𝐸෠𝜆ௌభ் [see equation (16) of appendix]. From the expression it is evident that change in output of 
sector X is dependent on change in educational capital used for training the unskilled labours. Thus 
𝑋෠ > 0when 𝐸෠ > 0. 
Explanation:The present model assumes that sector X is a skilled intensive technical sector that uses 
skilled labour (S) and a common type of physical capital (K) in its production process. Labours 
employed in this particular sector has gone through certain specific training programme to secure a 
job here. As more and more unskilled labours from other sectors of the economy get trained using a 
certain amount of educational capitaland are absorbed by the skill intensive sector, its output gets a 
boost. 
Proposition 3:Output of formal sector gets a boost due to inflow of educational capital even in 
presence of intermediation activities under specific factor intensity assumption. 
       Solving equations (8) and (9) and manipulating it we derive an expression for change in output of 
formal sector Y as 𝑌෠ = ா
෠
|ఒ|
(𝜆௄௑𝜆ௌభ்𝜆௅ே − 𝜆ௌభ௅𝜆௄ே) [see equation (20) of appendix].Now, 𝑌෠ > 0 if 
𝜆௄௑𝜆ௌభ்𝜆௅ே > 𝜆ௌభ௅𝜆௄ேas 𝜆 > 0. This is quite reasonable as 𝜆ௌభ் > 𝜆ௌభ௅and the intermediation sector 
may be assumed to be labour intensive in absolute term. 
Explanation:Sector Y is a formal traded sector of the economy that uses unskilled labour hired at a 
fixed higher pre-negotiated wage and physical capital in its production process. If we assume 
corruption sector to be more labour intensive in absolute sense then an inflow of educational capital in 
the economy will boost up the output of formal sector Y. Thus, the formal sector would expand. 
Proposition 4: An inflow of educational capital leads to a reduction in the degree of pursuing 
intermediation activities. 
Differentiating equation (9) and manipulating it we derive the expression for rate of change of amount 
of labour employed in the intermediation sector represented by N in our model. This is given by 𝐿ே෢ =
ா෠
|ఒ|
(𝜆௄௒𝜆ௌభ௅ − 𝜆௄௑𝜆௅௒𝜆ௌభ்) [see equation (21) of appendix]. Now, 𝜆௄௑ is significant as sector X is a 
skilled intensive technical sector. Moreover, 𝜆ௌభ் > 𝜆ௌభ௅ and thus 𝐿ே෢ < 0. 
Explanation: The economy in consideration is characterized by the existence of intermediation 
activitieswhich requires unskilled labour and physical capital. An inflow of educational capital in the 
economy motivates the labours engaged in intermediation activities to get trained and secure a job in 
the formal sector.Thus, labour forces are driven out from the intermediation sector and its output falls 
unambiguously. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have tried to trace out the effects of an inflow of educational capital on factor prices 
and output of different sectors of the economy. The economy comprises of two formal, one informal 
sector along with a corruptive sector. An inflow of educational capital has no effect on factor prices 
used in the model.But , the output of skilled intensive formal sector gets a boost due to inflow of 
educational capital without any factor intensity assumption. This is due to the fact that as educational 
capital flows in, more and more labour gets trained and secures a job in the skill intensive formal 
sector thereby raising its output. On the other hand output of formal sector using unskilled labour in 
its production process may expand if the intermediation sector is assumed to be labour intensive in 
absolute sense. This is quite a reasonable assumption. One most important and positive effect of 
inflow of educational capital is that it drives out labour from the corruptive sector, motivates them for 
training and these labours secure a job in the highest paid skilled intensive formal sector of the 




















Differentiating equation (2) and using zero-profit and envelope condition we get 
?̂? = 0  …………………………. (11) 
Similarly differentiating (1) and (3) we get 
𝑊ௌ෢ = 0 ……………………….. (12) 
𝑊෡ = 0  ………………………..  (13) 
Solving equation (10) we obtain 
𝑅෠ = 0  ………………………. (14) 
Differentiating equation (9) we get 
𝑆ଵ෡ = 𝐸෠ …………………… (15)as educational capital has no other alternative use except for training 
the informal workers. 
Differentiating equations (6), (7), (8)and then manipulating them we arrive at the following equations 
𝑋෠ = 𝐸෠𝜆ௌభ் > 0 …………………………… (16) 
𝜆௅௒𝑌෠ + 𝐿ே෢𝜆௅ே = −𝐸෠𝜆ௌభ௅………………. (17) 
𝜆௄௑𝑋෠ + 𝜆௄௒𝑌෠ + 𝜆௄௓𝑍መ = −𝐾ே෢ 𝜆௄ே  ………. (18) 
Using equation (4) we have 𝑍መ = 0 
Substituting this value and manipulating equation (18) we can write 
𝜆௄௒𝑌෠ + 𝐿ே෢𝜆௄ே = −𝜆௄௑𝐸෠𝜆ௌభ்  ……………… (19) 




(𝜆௄௑𝜆ௌభ்𝜆௅ே − 𝜆ௌభ௅𝜆௄ே)  …………. (20) 




(𝜆௄௒𝜆ௌభ௅ − 𝜆௄௑𝜆௅௒𝜆ௌభ்)  …………. (21) 
𝐿ே෢ < 0 if𝜆௄௒𝜆ௌభ௅ > 𝜆௄௑𝜆௅௒𝜆ௌభ் 
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